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How Sex Became a civil liBerty. By Leigh Ann Wheeler. New York, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2013. 
   For those of us who teach courses relating to sexuality and the law, it can be 
a Sisyphean task to help contemporary students grasp a world in which giving a 
lecture about birth control that involved the visual aid of a packet of spermicide 
could result in criminal prosecution. Yet, in order to understand today’s headlines 
about legal challenges to required insurance coverage of contraceptives, one must 
be able to trace how and why political, social, and legal understandings of sexual-
ity moved it from a deeply illicit taboo towards constitutionally protected rights. 
 In her book, How Sex Became a Civil Liberty, Leigh Ann Wheeler seems to 
claim this ambitious goal, announcing as the broadest characterization of her aims 
to trace “how the U.S. Constitution became central to discourse on sexual expres-
sion and behavior.”1 In her introduction, however, Wheeler identifies a much nar-
rower scope using a single organization, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), as the lens through which this massive constitutional shift will be viewed.2 
By focusing on “stor[ies] of personal experiences, contested understandings, col-
laborative undertakings, and turning points,” rather than any kind of “exhaustive 
history,”3 Wheeler’s aim is to show the personalities at the heart of what became a 
broad shift in political and social perceptions of sexuality. 
 Even with this significant limitation, Wheeler’s book is still a racing over-
view through only a few of the highlights of the personalities and issues involved 
in the first several decades of the ACLU’s work. While this is in some ways a limi-
tation, to fully cover the ACLU’s storied history would make a book unmanageably 
large. Wheeler’s achievement, then, is not in a comprehensive history of a 
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shift n pol tical and social perceptions of sexuality.
conceptual shift in American law, but in a fascinating narrative that provides mul-
tiple entrances for further areas of study. Her book poses more questions than it 
answers, but the questions raised are from fascinating, novel perspectives and they 
provide interesting additions to the typical legal scholar’s knowledge. Scholars, not 
only of sexual identity and civil liberties, but also of legal activism and the political 
process more generally, will find material that piques their interest and generates 
further thought and research. 
 Within the book, the ACLU’s work is broken down into chapters that focus 
on both time period and subject matter. The narrative begins with a bang: police 
breaking up the inaugural American Birth Control Conference led by Margaret 
Sanger,4 fights about monogamy between ACLU founders (and unhappily married 
partners) Roger Baldwin and Madeleine Zabriskie Doty,5 and vigorous ACLU de-
fense of nudists in the 1920s and 1930s.6 Once the narrative hits the key mid-cen-
tury decades spanning 1940 through 1980, however, the account cannot cover all 
the topics and personalities Wheeler hoped to include in a single pass, so chapters 
double back chronologically. Chapter three, to take one example, discusses the AC-
LU’s attempts to recognize First Amendment speech rights of readers and listeners, 
affecting regulations as diverse as postal restrictions on obscene materials and the 
Motion Picture Association of America movie ratings.7 All the analysis of speech 
and audience does not allow for any coverage of birth control or other issues related 
to the privacy of the bedroom, so chapter four begins again in the 1940s to track 
those questions in turn.8 
 This repetition is as much a product of the range of the ACLU’s work as any 
authorial decision by Wheeler, but even with repeated passes through several de-
cades much of the analysis is brief, leaving tantalizing hints of further interest ac-
cording to the reader’s own specialties. In my case, the tortured path towards mov-
ing gay rights onto the ACLU’s agenda proved interestingly reminiscent of more 
modern disputes in the gay rights movement implicating impact litigation and the 
political process. 
 In Wheeler’s rough division of topics affected by the ACLU, issues related 
to gay rights are discussed in relation to sexual expression rather than reproductive 
freedom, although a spirited argument could be posed for inclusion in the other 
chapters. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Wheeler’s book covers only the earli-
est stages of the gay rights movement. Even the 1990s, the latest time period cov-
ered in Wheeler’s book, are considered relatively early in the continuing progress 
of the gay rights movement—William Eskridge recently labeled the 1990s as “stage 
one” of the gay rights movement, in which the first order of business is simply 
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halting overt prosecution of homosexuals and bisexuals.9 Understandably, Wheel-
er’s chronicle does not discuss modern issues of LGBT equality such as marriage 
and parental rights, yet the debates portray eerie precursors of modern arguments. 
 Instead, the reader learns of the difficult task ahead of progressive ACLU 
leaders who hoped to make the organization view gay rights as a civil liberties issue 
at all. The ACLU’s first representation of any gay victims of government persecu-
tion took place during the Red Scare of the 1950s.10 Senator Joseph McCarthy’s 
witch hunt to identify and eliminate communists in the federal government was 
motivated by anti-communist fervor, but incorporated and exploited homophobia 
to create a “Lavender Scare.”11 The logic was that any homosexual government 
employee was vulnerable to blackmail by communist agents and as a result there 
was a “wholesale persecution” of homosexuals in government service.12 Although 
the ACLU was directly involved in anti-McCarthy efforts, including representation 
of victims of the Lavender Scare, ACLU leadership did not consider the Lavender 
Scare itself nor persecution of homosexuals more generally to be a civil liberties 
issue. 13 
 Similarly, the ACLU received repeated requests for representation or other 
involvement in the discharge of homosexual members of the military. The national 
ACLU legal director informed a group of lesbian soldiers that there were no civil 
liberties implicated in their discharge and proposed that if they truly wanted to stay 
in the military and to abandon homosexuality, then they should “seek medical 
treatment.”14 To the modern reader who views the ACLU as intensely progressive, 
such anecdotes are jarring and a necessary reminder of how recent the achieve-
ments of the gay rights movement truly are. 
 Wheeler’s coverage of the ACLU and LGBT issues is particularly fascinat-
ing when parallels emerge to other aspects of the modern gay rights movement. The 
national ACLU leadership was particularly reticent to take on gay rights issues, 
even as prominent board members and individual ACLU supporters were leaders in 
the nascent movement. Rather than leadership from the top, Wheeler explains that 
local branch affiliates of the ACLU effectively pushed gay rights onto the national 
agenda by taking on cases at the local level, thus forcing some kind of action—if 
only a reaction once cases reached the headlines—from the national organization. 
The very same process was repeated among gay rights organizations debating 
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whether to make marriage equality a central goal in the 1990s. The Hawaii same-
sex marriage case Baehr v. Lewin15 is thought of today as the spark of the modern 
marriage equality movement. Despite its ultimate failure to secure same-sex mar-
riage in Hawaii at the time,16 Baehr vaulted same-sex marriage onto the national 
scene, sparking a huge backlash embodied most infamously in the Defense of Mar-
riage Act.17 The case, however, was not the product of an activist organization. The 
case was proposed to Lambda Legal as well as the ACLU and Dan Foley, a former 
ACLU attorney.18 Although Foley likely was unaware of this at the time, the coun-
try’s leading gay rights organizations were already engaged in discussion as to 
whether marriage equality should be added to their central goals.19 Disagreement 
among activists was heated, but the groups had eventually resolved against taking 
any actions towards securing marriage equality.20 The proposal caused a revisiting 
of the topic, and Lambda Legal decided against taking the case, in part for long-
term strategic reasons and in part because they thought the case simply had no 
chances of success.21 
 Similarly, the case that was eventually heard before the United States Su-
preme Court as Hollingsworth v. Perry22 was brought without the cooperation of the 
leading gay rights legal organizations.23 Douglas NeJaime, who has written exten-
sively about the strategic dimensions of impact litigation using marriage equality as 
a case study, described the initial filing as having “defied the strategic vision” of 
attorneys at the ACLU, among other organizations.24 In his seminal article, Winning 
Through Losing, NeJaime discusses the possible “[p]roductive [p]otential[s]” of 
losing a court case.25 NeJaime argues that among other things, a prominent loss in 
     15.  852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
     16.  While the case was still pending before state courts, Hawaiian voters passed a state 
constitutional amendment limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. See Dara E. Purvis, Eval-
uating Legal Activism: A Response to Rosenberg, 17 BUFF. J. gender L. & Soc. PoL’y 1, 41 
(2009).
     17.  Id. at 48. 
     18.  See Purvis, supra note 16, at 20 (discussing the proposal to Lambda Legal); Michael 
D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 
33 U. hAW. L. rev. 705, 708 (2011) (discussing the proposal to the ACLU and the role of Dan 
Foley). 
     19.  See Purvis, supra note 16, at 19.
     20.  Id.
     21.  See Purvis, supra note 16, at 20.
     22.  133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
     23.  Adam Liptak, To Have and Uphold: The Supreme Court and the Battle for 
Same-Sex Marriage 416 (2013) (ebook available on amazon.com). 
     24.  Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 emory L.J. 663, 664 (2012) 
(citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff ’d sub nom. Perry 
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 
2652).
     25.  Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 ioWA L. rev. 941, 969 (2011).
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court can help to strengthen an organization’s identity and mobilize its constituents 
towards further activism and fundraising.26 I have written previously to argue that 
the examples of Hawaii and other same-sex marriage losses in court show another 
function of lawsuits outside of the courtroom: that individual activists can use liti-
gation to change the agenda of organizations from within.27 
 It appears that this process helped to turn the ACLU’s eye to gay rights is-
sues. The process was not exclusively from below—Wheeler also outlines the frus-
trating tasks ahead of individual ACLU leaders attempting to convince other board 
members to view gay rights issues as civil liberties concerns. In the 1950s, the 
ACLU’s new legal director, Rowland Watts, came to the job hoping to address ho-
mophobia.28 Although his hopes of bringing lawsuits on behalf of LGBT individu-
als were stymied, he was successful in pushing the ACLU to adopt a policy state-
ment that stated the ACLU could (not would) support the defense of individuals 
subjected to homophobia.29 The statement did not lead to any cases, but the mere 
existence of the policy statement meant that the ACLU became a sort of networking 
hub, referring potential litigants to other burgeoning gay rights organizations.30 
 Although Wheeler conceptually divides sexual expression and reproductive 
freedoms in the organization of her book, activists recognized that the two concepts 
were linked and that advocating birth control could lead the organization further 
towards issues of gay rights.31 At the 1964 ACLU Biennial Conference, an extraor-
dinary reproductive justice activist named Harriet Pilpel gave a plenary presenta-
tion arguing that the ACLU was refusing take the lead on “the most difficult issues 
of all, ‘namely abortion and homosexuality.’”32 Pilpel worked with the ACLU and 
was a mentee of one of the organization’s founders, but was not within the inner 
circle of the ACLU leadership. At that conference, however, Pilpel met Dorothy 
Kenyon, who was the only woman on the ACLU’s board for years and had more of 
a platform to lobby ACLU leadership.33 Wheeler describes their meeting as mo-
mentous in the ACLU’s history, as Pilpel and Kenyon’s friendship and cooperation 
“portended a sea change within the ACLU as women individually and collectively 
gained ground in staff and policy-making positions that would take the ACLU’s 
budding new privacy agenda in unexpected directions.”34 
 In the meantime, however, the ACLU’s first forays into gay rights were not 
seen as equality claims brought on behalf of LGBT Americans. Instead, the first 
     
     26.  See id. at 983.
     27.  See Purvis, supra note 16, at 31−32.
     28.  WheeLer, supra note 1, at 110.
     29.  See id. at 111.
     30.  Id.
     31.  Id. at 114.
     32.  Id. at 115.
     33.  See id. at 33.
     34.  Id. at 116.
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examples of representing gay or lesbian defendants were justified by additional 
civil liberties infringements that were freestanding claims themselves—violations 
of the free speech rights of gay magazines, for example.35 Initially, the speech 
claims were the sole justifications for the lawsuits—ACLU leadership saw civil 
liberties violations where media outlets rejected ads from “homophile” 
organizations,36 or where postal authorities reported recipients of gay magazines to 
the recipients’ employers.37 
 By the 1960s, however, Wheeler states that branch ACLU affiliates “began, 
as they had with other issues, to get out ahead of the national organization on the 
matter of homosexual rights.”38 Due in large part to the work of the branch organi-
zations, by 1966 Newsweek identified the ACLU as the only organization not en-
tirely devoted to LGBT rights that “actively opposed laws against homosexual 
acts.”39 This was a startling victory by more progressive branch activists in the 
public sphere, deserving of further exploration and explanation. The ACLU was 
certainly not actively working for LGBT equality writ large, but local activists had 
succeeded in changing the perception of the ACLU on the national stage. By the 
1970s, Marilyn Haft was leading the ACLU Sexual Privacy Project, which was 
funded by the Playboy Foundation, to challenge “laws that criminalized private, 
consensual, sexual conduct between adults.”40 Although the project lost every one 
of its cases and ended in 1977,41 there were several cases brought in 1976 challeng-
ing sodomy prosecutions.42 Wheeler cites the project as the ancestor of modern 
ACLU efforts such as today’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and AIDS 
P r o j e c t . 4 3 
 If the narrative of legal activism was a straight line, this assertion would be 
deeply puzzling—how could a series of losses possibly lead to the ACLU’s modern 
leadership in LGBT issues? As Wheeler puts it, “When asked, in 2010, what the 
short-lived Sexual Privacy Project accomplished, Marilyn Haft laughed. ‘You know 
we lost every case,’ she admitted. But court victories are not the only measure of 
success.”44 Such early losses may have been deeply important wins, in other words, 
     35.  Id. at 155.
     36.  Id. at 154.
     37.  Id. 
     38.  Id. at 155.
     39.  Id.
     40.  Id. at 161.
     41.  See id. at 175.
     42.  Id. at 174. One was an entrapment case in which the owner of a massage parlor and 
bookstore was propositioned by a “seventeen-year-old marine and decoy for the local police.” 
Id. As was typical until public scandal forced the practice to close, the decoy actually commit-
ted fellatio and sodomy with the entrapment subject as part of his service for law enforcement. 
Id.
     43.  Id. at 177.
     44.  Id. at 176.
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because they helped mobilize the institutional weight of the ACLU behind such 
claims. The significance of Haft’s work, as well as the work of progressive branch 
ACLU employees, individual ACLU lawyers, and board members who all hoped to 
throw the ACLU’s force against homophobia, was in the internal ACLU chronicle 
of how the national organization eventually adopted gay rights onto its agenda. 
Wheeler’s achievement in How Sex Became a Civil Liberty is thus not in actually 
explaining exactly how sex in all its permutations came to be understood as a con-
stitutional issue, but in giving a historical perspective as to how individuals banded 
together under the auspices of the ACLU with many different ideas of how sex 
might or should be viewed as constitutionally protected. 
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